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Even though formal property rights are the theoretical response to open access involving natural and
environmental resources, they typically are adopted late after considerable waste has been endured.
Instead, the usual response in local, national, and international settings is to rely upon uniform rules
and standards as a means of constraining behavior. While providing some relief, these do not close
the externality and excessive exploitation along unregulated margins continues. As external costs and
resource values rise, there finally is a resort to property rights of some type. Transfers and other concessions
to address distributional concerns affect the ability of the rights arrangement to mitigate open-access
losses. This paper outlines the reasons why this pattern exists and presents three empirical examples
of overfishing, over extraction from oil and gas reservoirs, and excessive air pollution to illustrate
the main points.
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“More typically, ITQs have been put in place after a fishery has reached a 
crisis and other regulations have proven inadequate. Even then the 
disputes over initial allocations and other design features of the proposed 
system have gone on for years. In the meantime the situation has gotten 
worse. This has happened in the United States, in Iceland, and in Chile.”
2 
 
“The contrasts between unit operation in southwest Asia and 
“unregulated” operation in the United States are unfavorable to the 
wasteful system followed in developing American fields…It is difficult to 
understand why in the United states, even admitting all obstacles of law 
and tradition, not more than a dozen pools are 100 percent unitized (out of 
some 3,000) and only 185 have even partial unitization.” 
3 
 
“Turning to institutional considerations, the very structure of pollution 
problems promised something less than rapid resolution; there were strong 
incentives to pollute and weak ones at best to achieve control. Policy, of 
course, aggravated these unhappy facts. By its inertia, its allocation of the 
burden of uncertainty, its early reliance on volunteerism, its approach of 




Despite their attractions for more effectively reducing open-access losses 
involving natural and environmental resources, formal property rights typically come late 
after considerable waste has been endured. Instead, the first official response, when it 
comes, is prescriptive government regulation that calls for uniform rules and standards as 
a means of constraining behavior.  Only later, when these have proven ineffective to 
prevent further external costs and resource values have risen is there a resort to property 
                                                 
2 Rögnvaldur Hannesson, 2004, The Privatization of the Oceans, Cambridge, MIT Press, 171. 
 
3 Joe S. Bain, 1947, The Economics of the Pacific Coast Petroleum Industry, Part III: Public Policy Toward 
Competition and Pricing, Berkeley: University of California Press, 29, note 13. 
 
4 James E. Krier and Edmund Ursin Krier, 1977, Pollution and Policy: A Case Essay on California and 
Federal Experience with Motor Vehicle Air Pollution, 1940-1975, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
296. 
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rights of some type.
5 This paper outlines the theoretical reasons why this pattern exists 
and presents three empirical examples of overfishing, over extraction from oil and gas 
reservoirs, and excessive air pollution to illustrate the main points. The paper is not 
advocating the assignment of property rights as the only institutional response to the 
wastes of over access, but rather is describing why delay is a common feature in the 
assignment property rights.  
The key argument is that early, formal property rights involve high resource and 
political costs relative to their expected gains. They have formidable information and 
input requirements in allocation, measurement, bounding, and enforcement, and they 
have substantial distributive effects when there is too much uncertainty as to how these 
might impact key constituencies.  Hence, there is delay in the assignment of property 
rights to address open access. In this context, delay implies an optimal time for shifting 
regimes, from open access to uniform regulation to property rights. During this period of 
transition asset rents are dissipated, but enduring these losses does not imply inefficiency 
when the resource costs of developing the institutional response (regulation, property 
rights) are considered.  As outlined below, a focus solely on rent dissipation in 
determining the optimal timing of response is incomplete without incorporating the 
                                                 
5 There are exceptions when the resource is of very high value, information costs regarding the problem are 
low, and rights can be relatively easily assigned. Consider gold and silver and other hard rock minerals. For 
Discussion see Gary D. Libecap, 2007, “The Assignment of Property Rights on the Western Frontier: 
Lessons for Contemporary Environmental and Resource Policy,” Journal of Economic History, 67(2): 257-
291, especially 266-271.  When these conditions are not met, however, the general processes of delay and 
inertia are characteristic. Throughout this discussion I am referring to formal regulation and property rights 
rather than informal norms and customs that can be adopted under certain circumstances to address 
common pool resources (CPR). More generally, see Elinor Ostrom, 1990, Governing the Commons: The 
Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, New York: Cambridge University Press for discussion of 
local responses to open-access losses. 
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transaction costs of collective action within groups, within the political arena, and across 
countries.
6 
When the value of the resource or the cost of the externality is relatively low, 
prescriptive regulation to limit exploitation through uniform restrictions can be cost 
effective and politically acceptable.  Information demands are limited to the setting and 
administering general rules and standards; it does not involve obvious redistribution; and 
reliance upon standardized regulations reduces uncertainty regarding the impact on 
constituencies. The various parties involved can predict how they might be affected and 
their current political and wealth standings are unlikely to be importantly altered. At the 
same time, however, these policies incompletely address the externality, leaving many 
margins for rent dissipation unconstrained.   
Over time as the externality becomes more serious, information is generated about 
the benefits and costs of property rights in confronting it; information asymmetries are 
reduced; and overall uncertainty is diminished. At that point more parties see that they 
will be made better off, and it becomes more economically rational and politically 
feasible to adopt property rights.   
Property rights are relevant because they address the externality directly and link 
individual incentives with social objectives for resource use. But they are adopted only 
when their costs are offset by the aggregate rents that are saved from over exploitation. 
Since these transaction costs can be considerable, the value of the resource and the nature 
of uncertainty determine the optimal time for introducing formal property rights. Crises 
                                                 
6 The even greater complications of devising property institutions in response to open access in the third 
world when there is contested institutional interactions among laws, norms, and agreements are described 
by Daniel Fitzpatrick, 2006, “Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World Tragedy 
of Contested Areas,” 115 Yale Law Journal 996. 
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that suddenly and sharply raise benefits and lower uncertainty speed this process.
7 Crises 
are events or spikes that dramatically raise the wastes associated with open access and at 
the same time lower the transaction costs of collective action by providing new 
information about the benefits of institutional change to combat the problem. 
II. The Problem of Open Access. 
Too much air pollution, over fishing and depletion of stocks, too rapid withdrawal 
from subsurface oil and gas reservoirs or water from aquifers are all examples of “The 
Tragedy of the Commons”.
8 The tragedy occurs because there are no clear property rights 
(informal or formal, group or individual) to the resource and open access prevails. As a 
result, individuals do not bear the full costs of their actions so that excess and waste are 
the result. Aggregate short-term production or use levels are too high and investment is 
too low.  The parties inflict harm on one another with costly technological and pecuniary 
externalities. In anticipation of these spillovers, there can be competitive rush to exploit 
the resource. Because exchange is not possible within large groups in the absence of 
property rights, the parties cannot bargain with one another to constrain behavior or to re-
                                                 
7 Similarly, see Krier and Ursin  (1977, 3, 255) and James E. Krier, 1994, “The End of the World News,” 
Symposium Twenty-Five Years of Environmental Regulation, Loyola Law Review, 27 (3): 851-66, 856 
and Tom Tietenberg, 2007, “Tradable Permits in Principle and Practice,” in Jody Freeman and Charles D. 
Kolstad, eds, Moving to Markets in Environmental Regulation, New York: Oxford University Press, 63-94, 
69. He points to a belated trend in resort to property rights with 9 applications in air pollution control, 75 in 
fisheries, 3 in managing water resources, 5 in controlling water pollution and 5 in land use control. 
 
8 Garrett Hardin, 1968, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162: 1243-8. Hardin was not the first to 
outline the logic and losses in the tragedy of the commons.  More than a decade before his article, H. Scott 
Gordon, 1954, “The Economic Theory of A Common-property Resource: The Fishery,” Journal of Political 
Economy 62(2): 124–142 clearly described a similar process. Gordon=s analysis was extended by Anthony 
Scott, 1955, “The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership,” Journal of Political Economy 63(2): 116-24 
and by Steven Cheung, 1970, “The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource,” 
Journal of Law and Economics 13(1): 49–70, among others.   
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allocate the resource to higher-valued uses currently or across time.
9  There are no price 
signals to reveal opportunity costs and free riding is rampant. Valuable labor and capital 
inputs are diverted from productive use to predation and defense.
10 Conflict and violence 
are potential outcomes.  
These wastes can be large, and the social savings from avoiding them provide the 
incentives for collective action to secure more official group or government regulation of 
access and resource use or to assign property rights for private restrictions on behavior. In 
the following section, a framework is presented to describe the collective action problem 
in bargaining within groups and across groups to address the tragedy of the commons.    
III. Analytical Framework. 
 
A. Bargaining within Groups. 
 
In collective action negotiations, each party determines whether or not to 
participate by comparing their current welfare situation with what is forecast through 
group efforts. If individual expected net gains are positive, the parties will chose to take 
action with the group. These net gains are a function of the predicted aggregate benefits 
and costs of eliminating the externality and their proposed distribution among group 
members. The greater the uncertainty associated with cost and benefit calculations, the 
lower the anticipated returns. The benefits of group efforts also depend upon monitoring 
and enforcement. If monitoring and enforcement costs are so high that free riding is 
                                                 
9 Bargaining of the kind discussed by Ronald Coase, 1960, “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law 
and Economics 3: 1–44 is not possible.  
 
10 For a classic study in the early California gold rush, see John Umbeck, 1981, “Might Makes Right: A 
Theory of the Foundation and Initial Distribution of Property Rights,” Economic Inquiry 19 (1): 38-59. 
But also see Richard O. Zerbe Jr. and C. Leigh Anderson, 2001, “Culture and Fairness in the Development 
of Institutions in the California Gold  Fields,” Journal of Economic History 61 (1), 114–143 and Karen 
Clay and Gavin Wright, 2005, “Order without Law? Property Rights During the California Gold Rush,” 
Explorations in Economic History 42(2):155-83 for a more nuanced views on the problem. 
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prevalent, then the advantages of collective action are reduced.  Indeed, as in cartels, 
widespread defection or failure to comply among members can lead to an unraveling of 
any arrangement to mitigate the losses of open access.
11    
Collective action is promoted if the number of parties is small; if they are similar 
in the expected net gains of agreement; if there is little uncertainty regarding the size and 
distribution of costs and benefits (information, measurement, bounding, and compliance 
costs are small); and if the aggregate gains of taking action are large relative to the costs. 
These are the conditions that characterize successful efforts among relatively 
homogeneous, small groups as described by Elinor Ostrom.
12   
Important deviations from these criteria, however, hinder group efforts.  If 
aggregate net gains are limited (the common resource is of low value and/or the 
transaction costs of addressing the problem are high), there are few incentives for action 
until values increase or costs fall. As group size grows, bargaining and compliance costs 
rise.  If the aggregate benefit is a public good (high bounding costs) whereas the costs of 
taking action are private, free riding and defection are encouraged.  
High information costs lead to uncertainty in calculating aggregate net gains and 
their distribution, and hence, in estimating how individuals will fare from group action. If 
                                                 
11  See Bjark Fog, 1956, “How Are Cartel Prices Determined?” Journal of Industrial Economics. 3(1): 16-23 
and George A. Hay and Daniel Kelly, 1974, “An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies,” Journal 
of Law and Economics, 17(1): 13-39 for discussion of cartel behavior. 
 
12 Elinor Ostrom, Elinor, 1998, “Self Governance of Common Poll Resources” The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and The Law, Peter Newman, ed, London: Macmillan Reference, Volume 3: 424-
32, 431lists the conditions necessary for self-governance of common pool resources to include clearly 
defined boundaries; the distribution of benefits is roughly proportionate to costs and appropriation rules are 
consistent with local conditions; affected individuals can participate; monitors are accountable to 
appropriators; there are graduated sanctions; appropriators have access to low cost, local arenas for 
resolution of conflicts; the right to organize are not challenged by governmental authorities; and there are 
nested enterprises for appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and 
governance. 
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the uncertainty is uniformly distributed across members, agreement on measures to be 
taken can still be reached. But asymmetric information and related differences in 
publicly-available and privately-held information about costs or benefits result in 
divergent views of the overall advantages of addressing the externality and sharing the 
resulting net returns.   
Collective action, which has not possible early, can become more practical after 
delay as transaction costs fall. New information emerges regarding the severity of the 
problem, reducing uncertainty and measurement costs and eliminating information 
asymmetries; the resource becomes more valuable (perhaps due to greater depletion), 
raising the benefits of action; new technology or techniques are developed to lower the 
costs of closing the externality; and the number of parties declines as the private returns 
to exploitation fall.  At this point, distributional concerns become subordinate to the 
overall need to respond to open access, and group efforts follow.  
B. State Action:  Political Bargaining Across Constituencies. 
 
If the open-access problem is larger, spreading across multiple groups or 
constituencies, then its resolution requires broader government involvement and the 
efforts of politicians. When there are numerous constituencies who are affected 
differently by the problem and the costs of its resolution, politicians must balance 
constituent interests in a manner described by Sam Peltzman and Gary Becker so as to 
maximize political support for taking action.
13 In so doing, politicians face the same 
problems encountered in the group negotiations outlined above.  
                                                 
13 Sam Peltzman, 1976, “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and Economics 
19(2): 211-240 and Gary S. Becker, 1983, “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political 
Influence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3): 371-400. 
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When constituencies are heterogeneous in the net gains of collective action, 
politicians must devise side payments from high gainers to those who expect to do less 
well in order to build a political consensus. They seek transfers that minimize political 
opposition and risk, but these can be controversial among general taxpayers if they seem 
to be too obvious and unfairly rewarding particular groups. Camouflaging transfers, 
linking them to popular public goods, and tying them to broad distributional norms 
reduce the political costs of transfers to politicians. Their design, however, may lower the 
overall effectiveness of the government regulation of the externality. Uncertainty in 
predicting aggregate costs and benefits and their distribution across constituencies 
complicates the crafting of side payments by encouraging disputes over the size, nature 
and direction of compensation, and these disputes increase political risk and reduce the 
expected benefits to politicians of deal making to address the externality.   
As a result, politicians select policies that lower uncertainty and raise expected net 
gains for key constituents. These include postponing any action; encouraging research in 
information about the externality; promoting new technology that lowers costs; investing 
in resource stock enhancement, including restricting access by non citizens or other 
politically-weak groups; and adopting standardized regulations that reduce the externality 
while appearing to be neutral and not changing the existing distribution of wealth and 
political power.  
The assignment of property rights to address open access entails more hazards to 
politicians. They are turned to only if general regulation fails to adequately remedy the 
problem and if the benefits of a rights system are clear enough to reward politicians and 
to offset political reaction. They entail the most direct and transparent assignment of 
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benefits and costs, as well as require more costly allocation, bounding, and enforcement 
policies.
14 Any property right that has meaning involves exclusion, potentially raising 
distributional conflicts. Further, the resource may rebound if open-access losses are 
reduced and become more valuable so that ownership brings new wealth, status, and 
political influence to those who secure property rights, changing existing social and 
political positions and inciting controversy that can be costly to politicians. Finally, 
constituencies that benefited from the previous regulatory arrangement are likely to be 
disadvantaged by the new rights system.  Inefficiencies generate their own constituencies 
for keeping things as they are.
15  
To build political support, politicians mold the assignment of property rights in a 
manner that achieves other distributional objectives or meets the demands of those who 
claim to be harmed. These adjustments also weaken the ability of the rights regime to 
reduce the losses of open access.  
The arguments outlined here regarding the government response to open access 
are similar to those described by Krier and Ursin.
16 They listed six themes associated 
with government environmental policies: 1). Politicians (and agency officials) adopt 
regulations that take the path of least resistance; that they are reactive, rather than 
precautionary in order to garner political support for regulation and to minimize the 
political risk of adopting inappropriate or extremely costly policies. 2). Politicians place 
                                                 
14 As pointed out by Thomas Merrill, the nature of the ex ante allocation rule affects the costs of assigning 
property rights.  For example, assignment of rights where possible by accession (tying rights to the 
ownership of related resources) could be less costly than reliance upon first possession where documenting 
past use is required and where there is the potential for dissipation due to a race to document previous use. 
For discussion of the costs of first possession, see David Haddock, 1986, “First Possession Versus Optimal 
Timing: Limiting the Dissipation of Economic Value,” 64 Washington University Law Quarterly, 775. 
 
15 Hannesson (2004,173). 
 
16 Krier and Ursin (1977, 11-13, 252-304).   11
the burden of uncertainty on those parties seeking policy change. Since new regulations 
potentially impose vague costs on other constituencies, politicians insure that proposed 
standards and other controls are based on reliable data through additional research. 3). 
Political action follows crises that clarify the benefits of new policies through the 
generation of additional information and a broader sense of immediacy among citizens. 
4). Politicians rely on technological solutions, rather than more fundamental programs to 
change citizen behavior, which can be controversial with costs spread unevenly.  Since 
technology mandates can be applied uniformly, they appear to maintain existing 
distributions of wealth and political support and avoid divisive distributional issues, 
especially in the design of transfer payment schemes.  5). Politicians take action only 
after research and learning reveal what is most likely to work, lowering uncertainty and 
the costs imposed on constituents. 6). There is a lag or a seemingly “unwarranted delay in 
government resolution of a social problem.”   
C. Bargaining Across States. 
When environmental and natural resource externality problems cross political 
boundaries as in the case of green house gas (GHG) emissions and wild ocean fisheries, 
the bargaining to address them occurs among politicians as representatives of various 
national constituencies.  The same information and uncertainty problems and public 
choice considerations described above apply in these negotiations. They are more severe 
because of greater information problems, more heterogeneity, and higher monitoring and 
enforcement costs among the jurisdictions affected.
17  
                                                 
17  For discussion of the transactions costs of cross-country bargaining, see Beth V. Yarborough and Robert 
M. Yarborough, 1994, “International Contracting and Territorial Control: The Boundary Question,” Journal 
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150 (1) 239-264 and James K. Sebenius, 1984, Negotiating the 
Law of the Sea, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.   12
In international negotiations toward resolution of an open-access resource 
problem, the expected benefit that a country derives is the sum of both the net gains 
resulting from international actions, plus any transfer payments that it receives (or 
provides). No national politician will seek the support of his or her constituents unless the 
country’s expected net benefits exceed the cost of no agreement. 
If the underlying constituencies in a country are very heterogeneous with respect 
to support for international efforts, then the politician representing them has to balance 
international demands with differential constituent costs and benefits to maximize 
internal political support.  As noted above, this requirement poses a formidable public-
choice problem, and it is more complicated if there is important uncertainty about the net 
benefits of international efforts. The benefit that any internal group derives from a 
particular international effort depends on its outcome. Incomplete and imprecise 
information about the effects of international actions, the costs involved, and compliance 
generate uncertainty about the potential results of collective action.   
If uncertainty is widespread across countries, international efforts are unlikely. If 
countries vary in their expected returns, however, there is an opportunity to devise 
transfers to gain support. As in national negotiations, devising transfers is complex 
because of differing views on the appropriateness, size, form, direction, and timing of 
side payments. Additionally, there are greater problems of enforcing compliance by 
member states.  
For these reasons, just as in the national political arena, politicians have incentives 
to delay action until the open-access problem becomes serious enough to generate the 
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information needed to make the distribution of the benefits and costs across countries and 
across constituencies within them clearer. At that time politicians are better able to 
mobilize political support for international action that entails both costly production 
adjustments as well as paying (or receiving) internal and external transfers to garner 
collective efforts.   
All told, in group, national, and international actions to reduce the losses of open 
access, the incentives seem clear. The parties involved are more likely to reach agreement 
when uncertainty is reduced, when differences in expected costs and benefits across 
constituencies are narrowed, and when the aggregate benefits of collective efforts 
(reduced resource rent dissipation from open-access externalities) exceed the transaction 
costs involved. These points suggest that there will be widely differing views regarding 
the extent of early open-access problems and the importance of confronting them. These 
conditions encourage group members and politicians to wait. When action is taken, it will 
involve general rules, regulations, and standards that involve the fewest costs and 
information demands and raise the least allocation concerns.
18 These acts will be 
insufficient so that the problem will intensify. Only then, will formal property rights be 
implemented, and their success in attacking the externality will depend upon how 
distribution demands were overcome in their design and allocation.   
                                                 
18 For instance, consider the very general, non binding emissions targets adopted by Pacific Rim nations 
due to a lack of urgency on the issue of climate change. “Pacific Rim Nations Adopt Nonbinding Emissions 
Targets,” by Tim Johnson, New York Times, September 10, 2007, A12. 
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IV. Application: Fisheries. 
 
A.  Fisheries: 
  Wild ocean fisheries are a classic open-access resource.  With virtually unlimited 
entry and growing harvest pressures, the result has been depleted stocks, falling catch-
per-unit-of-effort, declining incomes, and over capitalization. These conditions follow 
from the high and growing value of fish as a source of protein, the fugitive nature of most 
species, the great migratory distances involved, overlapping or absent political 
jurisdictions, the absence of property rights, and large numbers of heterogeneous, 
competing fishers.
19  
The implications of open access have been understood for a very long time—
certainly by fishers themselves and by pioneering students of the problem, such as Scott 
Gordon, Anthony Scott, and Vernon Smith.
20 Nevertheless, in 2000, Quinton Grafton, 
Dale Squires, and Kevin Fox described the continuing dramatic wastes of over fishing 
and inappropriate regulation in the Pacific Northwest halibut fishery; in 2003, Ransom 
Myers and Boris Worm warned that the world’s major predatory fish populations were in 
a state of serious depletion; and in 2006, Jennifer Devine, Krista Baker, and Richard 
Haedrich provided a similar dire assessment for other deep-sea fisheries.
21  
                                                 
19 For discussion of the bargaining problem with heterogeneous fishers see Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. 
Libecap, 1982, “Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery,” American Economic 
Review 72(5): 1005-1022 and for general discussion of the emergence of various regulatory/property 
regimes,  Donald R. Leal, ed, 2005, Evolving Property Rights in Marine Fisheries, Lanham, MD: Rowman 
and Littlefield, Tietenberg (2007, 73-75), and Hannesson (2004).   
 
20 Gordon (1954), Scott (1955) and Vernon L. Smith,1969, “On Models of Commercial Fishing,” The 
Journal of Political Economy, 77 (2): 181-198.  
 
21 Quentin R. Grafton, Dale Squires, and Kevin J. Fox, 2000, “Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A 
Study of a Common-Pool Resource,” Journal of Law and Economics 43(2): 679-713; Ransom A. Myers 
and Boris Worm, 2003, “Rapid Worldwide Depletion of Predatory Fish Communities,” Nature  423: 280-
83; and Jennifer A. Devine, Krista D. Baker, and Richard L. Haedrich, 2006, “Fisheries: Deep-Sea Fishes 
Qualify as Endangered,” Nature 439, 29.   15
  The first government reaction to open access has been implementation of uniform 
restrictions on access and fishing effort, which minimize information requirements and 
avoid significant deliberate changes in status quo economic and political rankings among 
the parties involved. Uniform regulations, however, are unlikely to be fully effective 
because they do not align the incentives of the parties with the objectives of reduced 
harvest and conservation of the stock. Accordingly, if the fishery is sufficiently valuable, 
at some point there has been a turn to property rights of some type. But these have come 
late, only after the stock has collapsed and declining returns have made existing practices 
untenable. Even then, conflict of over the nature of the rights to be granted and their 
allocation has slowed adoption of a rights regime, constrained the privileges assigned, 
and limited the overall benefits obtained.    
  Rognvaldur Hannesson, Ragnar Arnason, and Ross Shotton, among others, 
outline a common process of open-access losses, delayed regulation, and finally, a 
limited adoption of individual transferable quotas (ITQ’s) or individual vessel quotas 
(IVQ’s).
22  Further, Ronald Johnson and Gary Libecap describe the contracting problem 
among fishers, who differ in skill and returns under both open access and regulation. 




22 ITQ’s are the most widely applied form of property right in fisheries (Hannesson, 2004, 56). See also 
Ragnar Arnason, 2002, “A Review of  International Experiences with ITQ,” Annex to Future Options for 
UK Fishing Management, Report to the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 
CEMARE, University of Portsmouth, UK  and Ross Shotton, 2000, “Current Property Rights Systems in 
Fisheries Management,” in Ross Shotton, ed. Use of Property Rights in Fisheries Management, 
Proceedings of the FishRights99 Conference, Fremantle Western Australia, Rome: FAO, Fisheries 
Technical Paper 404/1, 45-50. 
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These heterogeneities determine the kinds of regulations that can be agreed to and limit 
their timely adoption.
23 
  For migratory offshore fisheries, the closing of the commons required the 
existence of political jurisdictions and/or international agreements on fishing 
restrictions.
24 This began with the establishment of 200-mile exclusive economic zones 
(EEZ’s) by coastal states, but it did not occur until the 1970s following the Law of the 
Sea negotiations. For instance, Iceland staked its claims in 1975; the U.S. Congress did so 
in 1974, followed by Presidential Proclamation in 1983; and Canada acted in 1977.
25 
These national ocean claims, however, were not made part of international law until 
1994.
  There was nothing biologically or environmentally significant with 200-mile zones 
in fisheries, beyond which many stocks migrate. Efforts in 1993 to extend them to more 
effectively address over-harvest in the open seas under the UN Conference on Straddling 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks failed due to disputes among coastal states over 
the size of allotments. An international agreement was reached in 1995, but it did not 
extend the exclusive zones, rather it avoided the issue by vesting management in regional 
fisheries’ organizations that lacked any real enforcement power.
26  
                                                 
23 Johnson and Libecap (1982). 
  
24 Inshore, less mobile fisheries provide more opportunities for addressing the losses of open access. See 
examination of lobster fisheries in Maine by  James M.Acheson, 1975, “The Lobster Fiefs: Economic and 
Ecological Effects of Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Fishery, Human Ecology 3(3): 183-207; for other 
shellfish by Bonnie J. McCay, 1998, Oyster Wars and the Public Trust: Property, Law, and Ecology in New 
Jersey History, Tucson: University of Arizona Press and for in-shore fisheries by Fikret Berkes, 1986, 
“Local-Level Management and the Commons Problem: A Comparative Study of Turkish Coastal 
Fisheries,” Marine Policy, July: 215-229. 
 
25 Hannesson (2004, 38, 107, 116). 
  
26 Hannesson (2004, 41, 42). 
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The 200-mile limit, however, made regulation possible within it, and by the 1970s 
important, valuable fisheries were already seriously over exploited. Among these were 
the British Columbia salmon fishery, the North East Atlantic, Icelandic, and North Sea 
Herring fisheries, and the Norwegian cod fishery.
27 In response to these conditions, ITQ’s 
were suggested by fishery economist Francis Christy in 1973 as a means of raising 
fishing incomes and of motivating fishers to conserve stocks.
28  
The response to over harvest, however, was not the assignment of property rights, 
but rather the adoption of generalized season, vessel, and equipment controls. With 
diverse interests, ranging from inshore and offshore fishers, large and small boat owners, 
fishers from different locales, sports and commercial fishers, processors, equipment 
sellers, labor groups, and regulatory officials, there could be agreement only on 
standardized rules and not on the more difficult task of assigning and monitoring 
individual property rights.
29  Indeed, fishers and government officials had incentives to 
adopt visible, yield-enhancing restrictions that seemed to benefit all parties as a public 
good and to avoid policies that would more directly and transparently allocate fishing 
rents to specific individuals or groups. In this process, fishers were uncertain how they 
might fare in a property rights allocation, relative to their expected returns under more 
certain uniform rules.
30  
                                                 
27 Hannesson (2004, 69-71, 103, 116-117). 
 
28 Hannesson (2004, 71). 
 
29  Hannesson (2004, 172) stated: “More typically, ITQs have been put in place after a fishery has reached a 
crisis and other regulations have proven inadequate. Even then the disputes over initial allocations and 
other design features of the proposed system have gone on for years. In the meantime the situation has 
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Unfortunately, while attractive for technological and distributive reasons, these 
regulations did not successfully address open access. Non-citizens were excluded or 
given only very narrow access privileges, and this action alone provided short-term gains 
to the countries that implemented controls. But nationals were allowed to expand their 
fleets to fill the void, and they did so. Domestic fleets were subject to season constraints 
and equipment controls, such as vessel licenses to limit the total number in the fishery 
and minimum net sizes to release adolescent fish.
31  
Nevertheless, boat capitalization increased, stocks plummeted, and fishing 
seasons were shortened drastically. For example, in the British Columbia halibut fishery, 
when regulation began in 1980, total capacity was set 435 vessels, and new entry to meet 
that target was rapid, with the number of vessels rising by 31 percent within 9 years. 
Increased fishing pressure, however, brought a fall in the stock, and regulators gradually 
reduced the season from 65 days to 6 days by 1990. The shortened season led to further 
investment by fishers in larger and more powerful vessels and a competitive fishing 
derby to harvest as many fish as possible in the limited time available. Harvests had to be 
processed and frozen, and more valuable fresh halibut were not available for market after 
the season closed. In response to these conditions, IVQ’s were adopted in 1991.
32 After 
that, the number of vessels fell as quotas were purchased and consolidated and the season 
was expanded to 245 days by 1993 as stocks rebounded. With longer seasons fresh 
halibut again could be offered for most of the year.
33  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
31 Hannesson (2004, 61-62). 
 
32 Hannesson (2004, 111), Grafton, Squires, and Fox (2001, 686).  
 
33 Grafton, Squires, and Fox (2001, 685).  See Table I for vessel numbers and fishing seasons.  
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Similar problems with uniform regulation occurred in other fisheries.
 In the 1970s 
the Alaska halibut and sablefish season was over 100 days annually, but by 1995 (just 
before adoption of the ITQ’s) it had dropped to 2-3 days.
34 Additionally, the Canadian 
sablefish season shrank from 245 days in1981 to 14 days in 1989; the fishery was closed 
in 1995 and reopened with tighter restrictions in 1996.
35 
 
Although centralized regulation in fisheries generally has not been successful in 
protecting, let alone re-establishing stocks, ITQ’s and IVQ’s have been adopted only after 
crises when stocks have crumbled. This pattern is not only found in the halibut fisheries 
described above but also in the Canadian West Coast salmon fishery, the Newfoundland 
and Iceland cod fisheries, and others.
36   
Under ITQ’s and IVQ’s, regulators set the total annual allowable catch based on 
assembled biological information, anticipated environmental conditions, and expected 
harvest impacts. Each authorized fisher or vessel is granted a share in the annual catch 
based on the allocation rule, and the quotas generally can be traded, although with 
varying restrictions.  The most common allocation rule is first-possession or historical 
catch. Past investment in vessels and equipment also often is taken into account.
37 The 
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37 For discussion of the prevalence of first possession rules in fisheries, see Gary D. Libecap, 2008, 
“Assigning Property Rights in the Common Pool. Implications of the Prevalence of First-Possession Rules 
for ITQs in Fisheries” Marine Resource Economics, forthcoming.   20
advantage of ITQ’s is that they better align the harvest practices of fishers with practices 
that protect or enhance the stock. The value of their quotas, which often can be major 
sources of wealth, depends upon the long-term health of the stock.
38 Hence, there are 
incentives for self and group monitoring of compliance, and importantly, ITQ’s, as a 
property right, are the basis for further contracting among fishers to reduce fishing 
pressure.  
These advantages depend upon the strength of the property right, and this varies 
across countries. ITQ’s in the U.S. and Canada are clearly specified as being use 
privileges and not property rights, revocable without compensation. By contrast in 
Iceland, New Zealand, and Australia, ITQ’s are considered to be more secure property 
rights.
39 These differences in the nature of property rights follow from controversies over 
allocation and how some parties might fare under an unrestricted market system. 
Distribution concerns have resulted in various constraints on ITQ’s, and they are most 
severe in countries where fishing is a tiny portion of GNP, such as the U.S.
40 In the U.S. 
with its relatively few ITQ systems, there has been an effort to preserve the relative 
position of regions, communities, fleets, capital, and crew by limiting the assignment and 
trading of ITQ’s.
41  Some U.S. ITQs are reserved for community development and not 
granted to individuals. There also are formal limits on the size of individual quota 
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holdings and their transferability. In the Alaska halibut fishery, for example, only 
transfers from larger to smaller vessel classes are permitted, and no individual is allowed 
to own more than 0.5 percent of the total quota. There are other controls on share 
consolidation to limit holdings and to maintain a targeted number of vessels in the halibut 
fleet.
42 Further, in 1996 the Magnuson Act placed a four-year moratorium on the 
adoption of further ITQ’s in U.S. fisheries.
43  .  
B.  Oil and Gas Extraction.  
 
As with wild ocean fisheries, oil and natural deposits that lie under private lands 
in the U.S. are open-access resources. They are lodged in subsurface reservoirs under 
great pressure. When any part of the surrounding geologic formation is punctured by a 
well bore, a low-pressure area is created. Natural gas and oil migrate rapidly toward the 
opening. Migration potentially allows adjacent landowners to extract their neighbor’s oil. 
Movement depends upon subsurface pressures, oil viscosity, and the porosity of the 
surrounding rock.     
Because of the fugitive nature of subterranean oil and gas, in situ property rights 
are not assigned to surface land owners, as is done with fixed subsurface mineral 
resources, but instead are granted only upon extraction or capture, as is done with wild 
animals (minerals ferae naturae).
44 This ownership rule creates conditions for 
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competitive withdrawal. Owners lease exploration and production rights to oil and gas 
firms, and these firms have incentives to drill and drain to increase their shares of oil field 
rents, even though these individual actions lead to aggregate open-access losses.   
Rents are dissipated as capital costs are driven up with the drilling of excessive 
numbers of wells (more than geologic conditions require or price and interest rate 
projections warrant) and with the construction of surface storage, where the oil can be 
held safe from drainage by other firms.  Unfortunately, once in surface storage, oil is 
vulnerable to fire, evaporation, and spoiling.  Rapid extraction also increases production 
costs as subsurface pressures are vented prematurely, forcing the early adoption of pumps 
and injection wells.  Total oil recovery falls as pressures decline because oil becomes 
trapped in surrounding formations, retrievable only at very high extraction costs.
 Finally, 
rents are dissipated as production patterns diverge from those that would maximize the 
value of output over time. 
The problem of competitive withdrawal was recognized when oil was first 
discovered in the United States in 1859. The nature and extent of the externalities 
involved, however, were not well enough understood to attempt coordinated strategies to 
constrain them.
45  By the early twentieth century, however, the economic value of oil was 
high enough to raise concern about waste.  For example, in 1910, it was estimated that up 
to 11 percent of California's (a major producing state) annual oil output was lost owing to 
fire while in surface storage. In 1914, the director of the Bureau of Mines estimated that 
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45 See Libecap and Smith (2002, S591-S592).  
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the costs of excessive wells equaled about a quarter of the value of total annual U.S. oil 
production.
46 Oil recovery was estimated at only 10-20 percent of the total resource in 
place, but in many cases, it would have been much less than this overall average.
47   
These losses stimulated scientific research on subsurface reservoir mechanics and 
on how production practices could affect over all recovery.
48With this knowledge, there 
was a basis for negotiations among private parties to reduce the losses of open-access. 
Buyouts of all, but one party on a reservoir to place it under single ownership or 
unitization for cooperative production were the most complete solutions. Neither was 
widespread. As a result, as with fisheries, initial formal efforts to address open-access 
turned to state regulation, but this too did not arrive until comparatively late, in the 1920s 
and 1930s.
49 
State regulation focused on limiting the drilling of wells and the extraction of oil 
and gas from them.  The Texas Railroad Commission and other state regulatory agencies 
set monthly statewide production levels and allocated the total among regulated wells as 
quotas under a system termed prorationing. These production rules were applied 
uniformly to all oil fields, even though each field had a unique physical configuration and 
optimum production potential.   
Regulation was controversial, especially among the very numerous small firms 
(independents) that had adapted to open access and produced more than their share of 
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field deposits would warrant. Large firms (majors) tended to be the proponents of state 
intervention because they bore more of the field-wide losses of competitive extraction. 
To elicit the political support of small firm owners and oil-field equipment suppliers for 
regulation, they were granted preferential treatment. These privileges were a (costly) 
form of transfer payment, but were less transparent and more politically feasible than 
were outright cash payments.
50  
For example, individual well quotas, or allowables, were based on acreage and 
depth, but the Commission gave more weight to depth, encouraging oil firms with limited 
leased acreage to drill deeper. Minimum spacing rules were adopted to limit overall 
drilling, but the Commission also routinely granted exemptions to small firms. Further, in 
Texas, the large numbers of very high-cost wells (stripper wells) were exempted from 
any production controls. The costs of these uniform prorationing regulations and 
exemptions were criticized. By the early 1960s, energy economist M.A. Adelman 
estimated that they were substantial, probably exceeding $2 billion per year.
51 State 
regulation of well spacing and well production rates was able to reduce some of the 
losses of open-access.  
Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with state regulation led larger oil and natural gas 
firms to consider either private collective action through buyouts or unitization of fields. 
Unitization was the preferred solution for many firms because it maintained their lease 
ownership in the field at a time of considerable uncertainty about long-term lease values 
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that prevented agreement on sales prices. But lease valuation problems also hindered unit 
agreements.
52  
With unitization production rights are delegated through negotiation to a single 
firm, the unit operator, with net revenues apportioned among all parties on the field 
(including those that would otherwise be producing).  As the only producer on the field 
and a residual profit claimant, the unit operator has incentive to maximize field rents.  
Accordingly, unitization results in important economic gains: a time stream of output that 
more closely approximates the rent-maximizing pattern, increased oil recovery, and 
reduced wells and other capital costs.  
Unit agreements, especially during primary production when natural subsurface 
pressures could force oil to the surface, however, were very difficult to complete. 
Unitization during secondary recovery was easier because of existing coordination among 
producers for injecting water, gas, or other fluids to push oil out of the ground. Otherwise 
field output would plummet. Accordingly, secondary recovery and unit agreements could 
be written jointly, but the losses of competitive production during primary recovery 
remained.
  
The key issue of contention in these collective efforts is the allocation of shares of 
the net proceeds of unit production.
53 These shares are property rights to the unit rents 
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and are based on estimated pre-unit lease values. Contingent updates are not possible 
because once the unit is formed individual leases lose their meaning and reservoir 
production dynamics change.
54 The bargaining problem arises due to disagreement on 
lease values.   
  Lease values are based on current and cumulative oil and gas production, the 
estimated size of the deposit below them, predicted oil migration and viscosity, the 
porosity of the surrounding medium, and other environmental factors. Assessing these 
and calculating lease value involves subjective guesswork, and the process is contentious. 
Firms have private information that may be difficult to credibly convey to other parties. 
Public information, such as past production and surface acreage, can be poor indicators of 
lease value. The problems are greatest for small, strategically-located leases with most 
production potential, longest expected life, and hence, greatest long-term uncertainty. As 
fields age and primary production wanes, many leases become unproductive and others 
have short futures unless secondary injection begins. Accordingly, at those times, private 
and public information about lease characteristics converge and unit agreement is more 
feasible.  
As a result of conflicts over allocation, unit agreements can take a very long time 
to negotiate or they breakdown and result in incomplete units that cover only part of a 
field. In their detailed analysis of seven units in Texas and New Mexico, Steven Wiggins 
and Gary Libecap found that they required from four to nine years from the time 
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negotiations began until agreements could be reached. Moreover, in five of the seven 
cases the acreage in the final unit was less than that involved in the early negotiations.  
With incomplete units, part of the reservoir remained open-access or was organized into 
competitive subunits with significant losses.
55  
  The problems of negotiation are more difficult for reservoirs that involve mixtures 
of oil and natural gas. Differences in price volatility for the two substances make it 
difficult to agree upon conversion factors. Such reservoirs are frequent since 63 percent 
of the largest U.S. oil fields contained significant volumes of natural gas along with oil.
56 
Oil lease owners prefer to re-inject gas into the formation to expel the oil, whereas gas 
lease owners prefer to sell their gas.   
The huge Prudhoe Bay field is a case in point.
57 It was discovered in 1968, and 
unit negotiations took over eight years. Even then, the field was not effectively unitized, 
but rather was partitioned into two (competing) units or participating areas, one for oil, 
led by British Petroleum (BP) and one for gas, led by Atlantic Richfield (ARCO). 
Conflicts between the firms continued because of their differential production incentives. 
The original unit agreement was significantly amended on at least seven occasions during 
the 1980s and 1990s as disputes were settled on a piecemeal basis. By 1988, Prudhoe Bay 
production began to decline, not because of physical depletion of the underlying oil 
deposit but because of disagreement about which parties would pay for the facilities 
required to handle the rising volume of gas that was produced along with oil as the field 
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matured. Finally in 1999, BP purchased ARCO and effectively unitized the field, 31 
years after discovery.  
To promote unitization, states have intervened with compulsory or forced 
unitization statutes.
58 These statutes relaxed the unanimity voting rule on share 
allocations. In Oklahoma, compulsory unitization legislation was enacted in 1945. It 
stated that once 85 percent of the leases approved unitization, the remainder could be 
forced to join.
59 Small firms resisted the new law, challenged it in court, and attempted 
repeal in 1947. By 1951, however, opposition to compulsory unitization in Oklahoma 
was largely spent, and the original law was amended with little controversy to lower the 
required majority from 85 to 63 percent.
60 In Texas, however, small firms resisted the 
loss of the regulatory advantages afforded them through the state's prorationing 
regulation, and because of their large number and political influence, Texas was never 
able to adopt a compulsory unitization law.
61 Between the late 1940s and the 1960s, all 
other oil-producing states adopted some form of forced unitization law to facilitate unit 
formation. Not surprisingly, Texas has had a lower share of production from fully-
unitized fields than does other states.  It also has had more high-cost producers than other 
states. For instance, Libecap and Wiggins reported that as late as 1975 only 38 percent of 
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Oklahoma production and 20 percent of Texas production came from complete, field-
wide units.
62 
Accordingly, the pattern of responding to open access in oil and gas reservoirs is 
similar to that which occurred in fisheries. Tolerance of open access until the costs 
became large compared to expected benefits of minimally addressing it; adoption of 
uniform production rules, molded by political factors; finally, resort to property rights, in 
this case through buyout or field unitization. Uncertainty in estimates of how the parties 
would fare under new regulations or property rights regimes, relative to the status quo, 
delayed action. Even then, the extent and form of the side payments necessary to meet 
distributional and political demands, limited the effectiveness of the regulations and 
unitization (rights) arrangements that were possible.  
C.  Air Pollution. 
 
Excessive air pollution also is an open-access problem. Emissions arise from 
manufacturing plants, utilities, vehicle exhaust, as well as a myriad of other sources that 
are part of a modern economy. The opportunity to dispose of wastes in the air has been 
viewed as an entitlement, or a form of property right.
63 At the same time, there are no 
property rights to the atmosphere, which is fugitive and virtually impossible to bound. All 
of this provides the potential for too many emissions.  If the emitted particles are 
relatively large or they interact with local sunlight and geographical factors, as with urban 
smog, air pollution has localized effects. Where the emissions travel larger distances, as 
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with SO2, the external effects are more broadly cast, and if they migrate to the upper 
atmosphere, global externalities result, as with chlorofluorocarbons (CFC’s) and CO2. So 
long as releases are limited and the airborne stock is small relative to the atmosphere 
affected, there is little adverse impact. As emissions grow and the stock of pollutants 
increases, however, air pollution becomes a more serious problem. As concerns about air 
pollution have risen, the regulatory response has been slow and the adoption of property 
rights to mitigate the problem, when it has occurred, generally has come even later. 
Indeed, the notion of tradable emission permits to address air pollution was put forward 
by Thomas Crocker in 1966 and by J.H. Dales in 1968, but their adoption took another 30 
years.
64 
Consider the problem of urban smog. James Krier and Edmund Ursin (1977) and 
Krier (1994) describe the sluggish pace of government response to air pollution in 
Southern California. As they point out, although there had been growing persistence of 
smog in the Los Angeles Basin by the early 1940s, it took approximately 35 years before 
regulations were enacted to directly attack the major source of the problem—auto 
exhaust. Early state and local regulations ignored vehicle emissions.
65 In 1950 research 
revealed that there was a photochemical reaction that converted pollutants from refineries 
and motor vehicles into smog, but the focus of government action was on further research 
on air quality standards and the extent and nature of vehicle pollution.
66 All the while as 
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more research confirmed the link between exhaust and smog, the problem intensified, 
eventually involving air quality alerts by the 1960s.  
Even when the California Pure Air Act of 1968 authorized air pollution control 
districts, their authority was restricted.
67 The primary regulatory response was on 
technological adjustments to reduce emissions as a condition for licensing new vehicles 
and some used cars, and the establishment of uniform emissions standards for stationary 
sources, rather than on behavioral changes, such as restrictions on driving.
68 Most mobile 
pollution sources remained relatively unregulated by the state.  
The Federal Clean Air Act of 1963 set the stage for more involvement by the 
federal government in regulating air pollution, including federal auto emissions standards 
that followed from the Motor Vehicle Control Act of 1965. The Federal Air Quality Act 
of 1967 required states to set air quality standards consistent with the Clean Air Act. 
California’s Pure Air Act of 1968 set higher emissions standards and created the Air 
Resources Board with regulatory jurisdiction over mobile and stationary sources.
69 The 
Federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 established uniform air quality standards 
across the country and identified non-attainment areas where more restrictive controls 
were to be implemented.
70 Market-based, pricing approaches, such as emissions taxes 
were not adopted.
71 Although pollution levels were reduced in some areas, states 
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consistently failed to meet targeted standards during 1970-90, and in many areas air 
quality actually worsened.
72  
Finally, in 1994, some 50 years after the first concerns about smog, California 
implemented a property rights approach to reduce NOx and SO2, the major sources of 
smog, in the Los Angeles Basin with the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market, 
RECLAIM. Los Angeles was the only area in the country to fall into extreme non-
attainment of ozone level targets, despite previous regulatory efforts. Unfortunately, 
RECLAIM applied only to certain stationary facilities—utilities, refineries, and 
manufacturing plants and not motor vehicles.  
These facilities were granted emissions quotas, based on historical releases and 
annual reduction rates. The South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) 
set total annual allowable releases, with each facility’s quota a share of the aggregate. 
The quotas were a property right to emit pollutants, and they could be traded to 
encourage those organizations that could reduce pollution at lower cost to do so while 
selling the residual to sources with higher abatement costs.   
  There is a similar pattern of delay, reliance upon technology and uniform 
standards, and finally on property rights in national efforts to lower S02 pollution. In the 
1960s there was growing awareness of the damage caused to lakes and forests from acid 
rain downwind from power plants that released S02 into the atmosphere. The 1970 and 
1977 Clean Air Act Amendments set national maximum concentrations of S02 and the 
states were charged with meeting those standards.  
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To reduce emissions, the laws employed technology-based regulations. These 
included specifying the equipment to be used, such as types of scrubbers, even if the 
utility used low-sulfur coal, and setting new source performance standards that applied to 
new plants. Older plants were not regulated so that controls moved at the pace of the 
slowest or least able source to comply.
73 These rules benefited high-sulfur coal producers, 
mining unions, and Midwestern and Northeastern utilities with older facilities that burned 
high-sulfur coal. The losers were utilities with new equipment and that used low-sulfur 
coal, as well as coal producers in the West, a major source of low-sulfur coal. Subsequent 
dissatisfaction with the costs of these regulations led to the adoption of limited trading 
programs, including bubbles, allowing exchanges among different sources in a single 
plant; netting, allowing plant expansion if overall pollution did not increase; banking, 
allowing firms to carry forward unused credits; and offsets, allowing new plants to be 
brought on line if existing ones reduced pollution.
74 Despite the costs, total emissions of 
S02 peaked in the 1970s and declined through the 1980s.
75 
 
Nevertheless, acid rain continued to be a problem, and much more significant 
reductions in S02 releases were determined to be necessary, particularly new ones aimed 
at controlling emissions from the dirtiest units.
76The political and economic costs, 
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however, were viewed as being prohibitive unless policies were changed to allow for 
more cost-based approaches.  
During the previous 20 years, pollution abatement costs had continually increased 
as stricter standards were adopted. By 1990 U.S. pollution control costs had reached $125 
billion annually, nearly a 300 percent increase in real terms from 1972 levels.
77Existing 
uniform rules generally did not recognize that the costs of controlling emissions varied 
across and within firms. Since traditional regulation gave advantages to old plants and 
technology, there were few incentives for those organizations to develop new 
technologies to reduce emissions at lower cost. Newer units were forced to adopt the 
technology specified by the regulator, rather than that which might have been more cost 
effective.
78 Further, central regulation and its reliance on uniform standards could be used 
politically to disadvantage certain firms and regions (those that used and produced low-
sulfur coal) at the behest of entrenched interests (those that used and produced high-
sulfur coal) with little environmental benefit.
79  
In response, Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments finally authorized 
electric utilities to trade allowances to emit S02 while reducing total allowed emissions by 
approximately 50 percent. This was the first large-scale, long-term U.S. environmental 
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program to rely on tradable emission permits.
80 The objective was to reduce SO2 and NOx 
emissions by 10 million and 2 million tons respectively from their 1980 levels. The 
flexibility underlying the tradable emission permit system overcame political opposition 
to the ambitious air pollution reduction objectives.  
Under the permit system, an annual targeted level of emissions was set and 
prorated across permit holders, who were allowed to discharge a specified amount of the 
gasses. Emission permits were allocated to utilities through first-possession rules, based 
on past electricity production, heat generation, fuel use or emissions, free of charge, and 
hence grandfathered in existing utilities. Utilities in certain states such as Illinois, 
Indiana, and Ohio were allocated an additional 200,000 allowances annually during the 
first phase of regulation. Those states had important coal interests and all had ranking 
members or chairs of key Congressional subcommittees.
81  
These preferential quotas, as with those granted in oil and gas prorationing, were 
adopted, in part, to make the new property rights program politically viable for 
incumbent firms, and to encourage investment in new and renewable energy technology 
by newer utilities that had more limited quotas.  
As in the RECLAIM program, the permits were a tradable property right to 
discharge a specified amount of S02 and NOx. Rather than equating pollution levels 
across firms as in past regulation, by trading these instruments marginal abatement costs 
could be equalized across firms. Those firms that could reduce emissions at lower cost 
could do so and sell the residual emission rights, apply them to offset excess emissions in 
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other parts of their operations, or to bank them. An active market in emission permits 
developed. Adoption of tradable emission permits has been viewed as a successful means 
of lowering overall air pollution with a cost savings of over $1 billion relative to what 
might have been possible under previous regulation.
82 But as with similarly successful 
ITQ’s in fisheries and unitization in oil and gas reservoirs, tradable emission permits 
were not adopted until existing regulation proved both to be too costly and too ineffective 
in mitigating the losses of open-access. Moreover, by that time the benefits and costs of 
adopting property rights were sufficiently clear to allow side payments in the allocation 
property rights to address distributional demands.  
In efforts to address global air pollution externalities, the problems of uncertainty 
in estimating the aggregate costs and benefits of regulation and their distribution across 
countries have been even more severe in hindering timely action.  The very nature of 
global environmental externalities presents incentive problems. Abatement by any 
country benefits others as a public good, but if abatement is costly to a country’s citizens, 
its politicians have incentive to invest less in reduction efforts than would be globally 
optimal and free ride on cutbacks taken elsewhere.   
Consider first, the most successful effort to address international air pollution, the 
Montreal Protocol of September 1987 on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.
83 
Concern about the build up of chlorofluorocarbons in the upper atmosphere surfaced in 
1974 when two studies hypothesized that chlorine released from the breakdown of CFC’s 
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had destructive effects on stratospheric ozone.
84 CFC’s were inexpensive chemicals used 
since 1931 in refrigerants, solvents, propellants, and more recently in the production and 
cleaning of computer components and other electronics. The U.S. accounted for from 25 
to 30 percent of the world production of CFC’s between 1974 and 1986, and hence had a 
vital interest in any international agreement to regulate or eliminate their production.
85 
Congressional hearings were conducted on the extent of ozone depletion and possible 
remedies, but no unilateral action was taken. In 1977 the EPA proposed uniform 
regulations to prohibit manufacture, processing, and interstate distribution of CFC’s. The 
main advocates were environmental organizations and certain groups of scientists, but the 
U.S. chemical industry successfully opposed regulation.
86 
In the 1970s the imperative of taking unilateral action that could involve 
substantial economic costs in the U.S. was not compelling for key constituencies. The 
actual atmospheric mechanisms involved were incompletely understood, and the extent 
of ozone depletion and its consequences were unclear. Indeed, in 1983, under the Reagan 
Administration, the EPA advised Congress that no action should be taken until the 
relationship between CFC’s and ozone depletion was more clearly determined.
87   
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In March 1988, the NASA Ozone Trends Panel released additional scientific 
information suggesting that the ozone “holes” were larger than previously believed and 
that there were tighter links between ozone layer deterioration and CFC emissions. This 
new information helped to shift the U.S. position on international collective action. It also 
changed because domestic political opposition to regulation had diminished.  The 
chemical industry, with new technologies for CFC substitutes, no longer resisted 
domestic CFC controls, and it lobbied for international restrictions to phase out CFC 
production and trade.
88  A mandated switch to new CFC substitutes had potential to 
provide American firms with a competitive advantage relative to European producers of 
CFC’s.  Retrofitting by refrigeration and air-conditioning industries was costly, and U.S. 
CFC-substitute producers needed guarantees that their customers could not shift to 
alternative foreign sources of CFC’s.  An international agreement to regulate CFC trade 
would serve that purpose. Naturally European firms were more skeptical of the need to 
restrict CFC’s, and the support of European governments for regulatory action generally 
came later than the U.S.  Even then there were disagreements between U.S. and European 
representatives on timing and identification of the chemicals slated to be phased 
out.
89The more serious opposition, however, came from representatives of undeveloped 
countries who saw restrictions on CFC’s as being particularly costly.
  
The first international action was launched 11 years after the ozone “holes” were 
first detected. The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was 
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completed in 1985 and ratified by the U.S. one year later, in 1986.
90 As with early smog 
regulations in California, the convention offered no binding restrictions, but rather 
emphasized research. It established broad international objectives to protect human health 
and to promote study of the impact of CFC’s on the ozone layer. Disagreements, 
especially between representatives of developed and developing countries, blocked any 
actual CFC control measures.
91  For developing countries CFC’s were a source of low-
cost refrigerants, and the global externality resulted from a build up of emissions from 
developed countries. Accordingly, representatives of developing countries, notably China 
and India, demanded side payments to as a condition for coordinated action to protect the 
ozone layer.   
In response, representatives from the U.S., Canada, Japan, and Europe offered 
countries with low per capita consumption of CFC’s various exemptions from 
international regulations. This concession led to the agreement on the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol. Under the Protocol, developed countries were to cut production and 
consumption of CFC’s by 20 percent of their 1986 levels by 1993 and by 50 percent by 
1998. CFC trade with countries not adopting the restrictions was to be stopped.  With the 
notion of “common but differentiated responsibilities” developing countries were allowed 
an extra 10-year’s delay to reach reduced production targets and were authorized to 
exceed their 1986 levels of production by up to 10 percent to satisfy “basic domestic 
needs.”
92  
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Even so additional concessions had to be granted in order to get developing 
countries to ratify the protocol. A Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol 
was held in 1990 to devise additional side payments. A Multilateral Fund was established 
to provide developing countries with financial assistance and CFC replacement 
technology was to be transferred if they agreed to the protocol.
93  Creation of a 
multilateral fund, however, raised new distributional concerns among donor and recipient 
countries.  These included the size of individual contributions, the nature of penalties if 
donors defaulted on their assessments, the amount of money to be granted recipients, and 
their documentation requirements.
94 Not all of the issues could be resolved at the second 
meeting. Only very general language stating that the parties must take “every practicable 
step” to control CFC emissions could be agreed to. The World Bank was to be the 
administrator, and $160 million was to be made available to developing countries for 
complying with the CFC accord.  Further, the fund was to be increased by $80 million 
when India and China ratified the Montreal Protocol.
95  
It took 16 years to reach general international agreement on controlling the 
production and dissemination of CFC’s.  Regulation has been based on production bans 
and technological substitution. There also has been use of tradable emission permits for 
achieving compliance with the Montreal Protocol, and a tax on CFCs was introduced 
later to accelerate the phase out.  CFC emissions have declined, and taxpayers in 
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developed countries have born most of the costs of the regulations.
96 In the aggregate 
these payments likely have been relatively small, given the benefits involved of 
protecting the Ozone layer. Further, the chemical industry and environmental groups 
have been formidable constituencies within developed countries for the protocol.   
Despite all of this, the thickness of the South Pole ozone layer continues to 
decline during the peak ozone-depleting season, and there are calls for even stricter 
emissions controls.
 But the concessions made to developing countries to gain their 
participation pose barriers for further reductions. China, which has become a large 
producer of CFC’s and related refrigerants, is likely to resist loss of a profitable new 
industry.
97 .  
The second example of international air pollution control efforts to limit green 
house gas (GHG) emissions, however, faces even more difficult problems. There have 
been delays, differential responses among countries to calls to address the externality, and 
no success in reducing overall emissions. It seems unlikely that any effective, coordinated 
response will take place until crises increase perceived benefits and mitigate international 
distributional concerns.  The issues are quite similar to those that have arisen regarding 
CFC control. 
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Global warming has been a concern in many quarters at least since the 1990s and 
perhaps earlier.
98 It is an open-access problem. With unrestricted access to the 
atmosphere, gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2), Nitrous Oxide (N2O), 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFC’s) and methane (CH4) are released as by-products of human 
activities and other natural sources across countries. Regardless of their origin the gases 
are spread around the globe with potential external effects. The gases retard the re-
radiation of the sun’s energy from the earth’s surface back into space.  Under debate are 
whether and how much the further accumulation of these gases will generate a damaging 
rise in global temperatures and what to do about it.
99   
  There are many sources of uncertainty regarding aggregate effects of global 
warming, their distribution among countries, and the costs of reducing GHG emissions. 
The magnitude of global warming and associated climate change remains generally 
undetermined, although there is more of a consensus on the issue than even a few years 
ago.
100 The scientific uncertainty comes in estimating the rate at which greenhouse gas 
concentrations will increase, the corresponding impact of rising GHG concentrations on 
temperatures, the patterns of climate change across the globe, and their impact on the 
regions affected.
101 The research evidence on key aspects of these issues remains 
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incomplete and inconclusive.  The resulting scientific uncertainty regarding global 
warming allows politicians to chose among conflicting evidence for justifying positions 
desired by critical constituencies with more certainty than actual understanding may 
merit.
102  
  The necessary emission reductions in response to possible climate change and the 
associated economic costs involved are similarly unclear. The magnitude of the costs 
depends upon the amount of the reduction required for each country and its pace. There is 
the politically important issue of the global distribution of abatement costs. The costs are 
the greatest for the countries that produce the most CO2 and other green house gasses. 
The U.S. and China are currently the largest producers of CO2. Within countries 
abatement efforts will have differential impacts, with the transportation, manufacturing, 
and utility sectors incurring higher costs. There are many estimates of the costs of 
emissions controls in the U.S. with the results dependent on the assumptions made 
regarding timing, magnitude, and the instruments used.
103 Those countries and interests 
that anticipate bearing more of the costs of regulation understandably resist action until 
compensating arrangements are implemented, but agreement on them is subject to the 
same side-payment disputes noted above over who should pay and receive, the amounts 
involved and the forms and timing of compensation. These negotiations also are 
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undermined by uncertainty regarding the magnitude and distribution of the costs and 
benefits of international efforts.   
  Additionally as with the Montreal Protocol, there is no underlying enforcement 
mechanism within the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, which was the first formal international 
treaty to reduce GHG emissions.
104 Under the protocol monitoring depends on annual self 
reports by countries using comparable methodologies. Expert review teams are 
authorized with voluntary country visits. No consequences of noncompliance could be 
agreed upon, and the compliance provisions that are included apply only to Annex 1 or 
industrialized countries. Absent effective enforcement, there are incentives for countries 
to defect whenever the political costs become too high. 
Given the unclear and uneven distribution of the costs and benefits of 
international action and a general lack of immediacy in taking it, it is understandable that 
progress has been slow regarding global warming. As of December 2006, 169 countries 
had ratified the Protocol, but the U.S. and Australia had not, and China and India, as well 
as other developing countries which have ratified it, are not required to take direct 
action.
105 Indeed, representatives of developing countries continue to demand that most 
restrictions be implemented in developed countries. The Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012, 
and GHG emissions have continued to increase.
106  
                                                 
104 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html. 
 
105 http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/kpstats.pdf. China also is 
likely to resist restrictions on its profitable CFC and HCFC industries. One by-product, HFC-23 is 11,700 
times  more powerful as a global warming gas as CO2  See, “U.S. Plots New Climate Tactic: Speedier 
Chemicals Ban Sought by White House, But China May Resist,” John J. Fialka, Wall Street Journal, 
September 7, 2007, A8 on China’s production.  
 
106 http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggccebro/chapter1.html 
   45
  To lower the costs of GHG abatement, the Kyoto Protocol incorporated tradable 
emissions permits based on their success in SO2 regulation in the U.S.
107  In response, the 
European Union, which ratified the protocol, created a multi-national GHG emissions 
trading scheme, the largest in the world. Emissions were capped, and permits were 
allocated for virtually all stationary industrial and electricity-generating units in the E.U. 
A market developed with two trading periods, 2005-2007 and 2008-2012. The program 
generally has been viewed as a success.
108 This is the unusual case where property rights 
have been established relatively early in the process of responding to an open-access 
externality. One reason for this occurrence is general industry support due to lower 
information costs about the use of emission rights as compared to reliance upon uniform 
standards. Based on the lower costs and accomplishments of the U.S. SO2 trading 
program, relative to alternative centralized regulation, industry representatives may have 
preferred a cap-and-trade scheme over a more costly and uncertain multi-national 
regulatory arrangement.  If so, this institutional response is consistent with the overall 
thesis of the paper. 
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IV. Concluding Remarks: Delay in Response to Open Access and the Adoption of 
Property Rights.  
  
Theory and research regarding collective action in addressing open-access 
resource problems indicates that success in controlling externalities comes when there is 
a consensus on the aggregate benefits to be gained, that the parties perceive positive net 
gains from agreement, and that they are homogeneous with respect to bargaining 
objectives and in the distribution of the costs and benefits to be incurred.  Agreements 
reached under these conditions tend to be self-enforcing because it is in the interest of all 
parties to insure success.  Collective action may also achieve its objectives if the parties 
are heterogeneous with respect to the net gains from cooperation, if the spread is not too 
great and there are agreed-to bases for constructing side payments to compensate those 
parties that may bear more costs or receive fewer gains.  The resulting arrangement must 
be secure enough so that the side payments are long term and predictable.   
Uncertainty in predictions regarding aggregate benefits and costs of collective 
action and their distribution among constituencies complicates this process by raising 
transaction costs. Uncertainty makes it more difficult for parties to determine how they 
will fare with formal arrangements to mitigate open-access externalities. Accordingly, the 
incentives are for delay and for subsequent adoption of policies that involve the least cost 
and minimize distributive effects. Property rights which are the fundamental solution to 
open access, however, are more costly and they can result in a major redistribution of 
wealth and political influence.  In this case, it is efficient to wait as we have seen in 
fisheries, common oil pools, and air pollution control. Accordingly, for individuals, as 
well as, risk-adverse politicians and agency officials, property rights often are the 
solution of last resort, rather than the front line of attack on the tragedy of the commons.  